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Abstract 
 
It is possible to argue that the Financial Advisory Intermediary Services 
Ombud (hereafter FAIS Ombud) has jurisdiction to consider insurer's 
decisions not to update their internal administrative systems. The FAIS 
Ombud may therefore investigate such matters as a complaint as 
defined in section 1 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act 37 of 2002 (hereafter the FAIS Act). On the other hand, upon any 
failure to investigate such complaints, the complainant may approach 
the Financial Services Tribunal, either to give directions to the FAIS 
Ombud regarding how to investigate the complaint or to replace this 
failure with the Tribunal's own investigation/reconsideration of a 
decision as regulated in section 8 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter the PAJA). An administrative decision 
is defined in the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (hereafter the 
FSRA) which includes the statutory ombud (example, FAIS Ombud) 
decisions, such as a decision not to investigate a complaint. When an 
insurer's decision is in fact an administrative decision, reference should 
also be made to the FSRA, i.e. an insurer's decision to debar an 
employee/representative or a decision not to update relevant 
policyholder records with new information. An insurer's decision not to 
update policyholder records is not part of this statutory regulation 
(FSRA) of what constitutes an administrative decision; nevertheless the 
PAJA could still be relevant to understand when these decisions could 
be considered a public function. Although the latter falls outside the 
scope of this article, the National Horse Racing Authority of Southern 
Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 (N) is briefly discussed in this article 
with reference to a public function. In this article, the failure of the FAIS 
Ombud to investigate a policyholder's (hereafter client) complaint (the 
insurer is unwilling to update client records) is an administrative decision 
and it is specifically regulated by FSRA. For this reason, the relevance 
of the Financial Services Tribunal is discussed when the FAIS Ombud 
directs the complaint (or the client may also refer a matter in specific 
circumstances, as if the FAIS Ombud fails to investigate the matter 
within a reasonable time) to the Financial Services Tribunal for a 
reconsideration of the decision. 
Keywords 
Financial Services Tribunal; Financial Sector Regulation Act; public function; 
administrative decision; policyholder records; reconsideration; fraud; duty of 
disclosure; insurance law.  
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1 Introduction 
The FSRA1  became law in South Africa on 1 April 2018.2 Previously, the 
Financial Services Board made use of an appeal system to consider 
disputes between clients and insurers.3 Today, the appeal system is simply 
known as the Financial Services Tribunal.4 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
is regulated by section 230 of the FSRA, more specifically, with reference 
to the PAJA.  
In brief, section 230 incorporates relevant administrative law principles 
regulated by the PAJA when resolving disputes/complaints between an 
insurer and a client put before the Financial Services Tribunal. The purpose 
of this article is simply to analyse possible reconsiderations of decisions the 
Tribunal may make in future when applying the FSRA. This article will also 
indicate the impact or future impact of administrative law on the principles 
associated with the short-term insurance law landscape when settling 
disputes between an insurer and a client.5 The settlement of disputes is 
undertaken by the FAIS Ombud and/or other Ombud schemes (the Ombud 
for Short-Term Insurance (OSTI)) on a daily basis, and in this article we will 
consider how the Financial Services Tribunal will resolve insurance disputes 
with reference to the FAIS Ombud's decisions as part of administrative law, 
as required by section 230 of the FSRA.6 In doing so, reference will be made 
                                            
* Cornelius G Kilian. MA (Regensburg) LLM (UP) LLD (UFS). Associate Professor, 
North-West University, South Africa. Former research fellow, Deakin University and 
former research fellow, Free State University. I would like to thank the two external 
blind reviewers for their comprehensive comments and suggestions for drawing my 
attention to parts of this article that were not clear or needed more attention. I accept 
full responsibilities for any mistakes or unintended mistakes. E-mail: 
corneliuskilian@hotmail.com. 
1  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N); s 28 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (FAIS 
Act) regulates FAIS Ombud determinations. See the meaning of public in President 
of the RSA v SARFU 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 175. "Public" could also mean a section 
of the public. 
2  Godwin and Schmulow 2015 SALJ 757. The intention of this legislation is to provide 
financial stability in the design and execution of financial products by insurers, for 
example.  
3  The Financial Services Board (FSB) has been dissolved and replaced by the 
Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA). See GN 1433 in GG 41329 of 15 
December 2017 (Replacement of Policyholder Protection Rules). A policy is defined 
to include a policyholder. There is no definition of a policyholder. However, a policy 
includes a policyholder as either a natural or a juristic person.  
4  FSCA 2018 https://www.fsca.co.za/Pages/Default.aspx; FSA 2018 
https://www.fsca.co.za/Enforcement-Matters/Pages/Financial-Service-
Tribunal.aspx. This website explains the purpose of the Financial Services Tribunal. 
5  In South Africa short-term insurance is a term relevant to vehicle insurance, for 
example. Life insurance, on the other hand, is referred to as long-term insurance.  
6  Pečarič 2016 SAPL 91. The author contends that there is an increase in interest in 
administrative law, the largest increase among all law subjects; Kilian Financial 
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to a recent unreported Financial Services Tribunal's reconsideration of a 
decision in Swanepoel v Outsurance, where we will be discussing section 
230 relevant to the principles of insurance law pertaining to the FAIS 
Ombud's decision not to investigate Mr Swanepoel's complaint.7 The 
complaint was formulated in simple terms – Outsurance has a duty to 
update client records.8 To explain this more clearly, the FAIS Ombud took 
a decision not to investigate Mr Swanepoel's complaint and instead used 
the FSRA to refer the complaint to the Financial Services Tribunal for a 
reconsideration of its decision not to investigate the request to update Mr 
                                            
Services Board Directives 84. Directive 138 AI indicates the importance of an internal 
administration system that must comply with all the relevant laws of South Africa. 
Although this Directive is germane to the Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, it 
indicates the necessity to appoint a public officer to make sure that the internal 
administration system is compliant. This Directive refers to the King Report (IoDSA 
King IV); obviously the applicability of King IV cannot be overstated in terms of a 
reliable internal administration system or the relevance of corporate governance to 
insurance companies. It is also possible to review the decision of the Tribunal by 
making use of the Uniform High Court Rule 55A, as applied to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA). In short, the Financial Sector 
Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (the FSRA) describes administrative decisions as FAIS 
Ombud decisions and/or certain decisions taken by insurance companies, such as 
to debar employees. However, the common law is not excluded by the PAJA and it 
is possible to argue for the review of an insurer's administrative decisions in a court 
of law; for example, not the actual rejection of a claim but the decision not to maintain 
and/or administer the internal administration system of the insurer properly, or the 
failure of the insurer to make a decision.  
7  See in general the Rules for the Financial Services Tribunal (Financial Sector 
Conduct Authority 2019 https://www.fsca.co.za/Enforcement-Matters/Financial% 
20Services%20Tribunal/Financial%20Services%20Tribunal%20Rules%20-
%201%20August%202019.pdf). The Tribunal Rules 6 and 10, for example, refer to 
the reconsideration of decisions. It is not a ruling or a judgment. The reconsideration 
was delivered on the 4th September 2018 by Judge Harms. The ruling is quoted in 
full: "Application for Leave to Reconsider: 1. The applicant is dismissed. 2. It is based 
on vexatious and frivolous grounds. 3. The Ombud does not have the jurisdiction to 
make a determination as requested." 
8  Swanepoel v Outsurance Insurance Company FAB 71/2018 unreported 
reconsideration of decision. In terms of Rule 25 of the Financial Services Tribunal, 
new evidence may be introduced for the reconsideration of decisions. To request the 
unreported matter, the Tribunal may be contacted for reference purposes. The 
Tribunal’s reconsideration is not available on the internet and making reference to or 
discussing a Tribunal’s reconsideration is unusual. However, one should note that 
the FAIS Ombud's determinations (judgments) are considered equal in status to the 
civil judgments of a High Court of South Africa, the only difference being that legal 
representation is not required. In addition, the FAIS Ombud may refer matters to the 
Tribunal in terms of s 230, which requires the Tribunal to apply the principles as 
found in the PAJA. For this reason, the Tribunal and its decisions in terms of the way 
administrative law influences insurance law should form part of the South African 
academic environment. The OSTI and/or FAIS Ombud is an alternative dispute 
resolution system in South Africa and a client may approach either the OSTI or the 
FAIS Ombud relevant to motor vehicle insurance. The FAIS Ombud also has 
jurisdiction to hear situations arising as a result of complicated investment mistakes 
by investment companies, which the OSTI is unable to do.  
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Swanepoel's Outsurance records.9 On the other hand, had the complainant 
approached the Financial Services Tribunal directly, section 230 would still 
have been relevant since it makes reference to this approach and also to 
approaching the Financial Services Tribunal directly when the statutory 
ombud (the FAIS Ombud) fails to make a decision within a reasonable time. 
Section 230(1)(a) states the following:10 
A person aggrieved by a decision may apply to the Tribunal for a 
reconsideration of the decision by the Tribunal in accordance with this Part. 
A decision is defined as follows in section 218(d): 
A decision of a statutory ombud in terms of a financial sector law in relation to 
a specific complaint by a person.11 
And an omission to a decision which is not required to be made within a 
specific time period is regulated in section 218(g) as follows: 
An omission to such a decision within a reasonable period, if the applicable 
financial sector law, or rules of, or other requirements pertaining to the 
decision-maker require the decision to be taken but without prescribing or 
specifying a period. 
The above, more specifically sections 230(1) and 218(d), will be explained 
further in the following paragraphs with reference to the Swanepoel v 
Outsurance Tribunal case.  
                                            
9  The FAIS Ombud's decision was delivered on the 10th August 2018 by Mr Michael 
Willmore and the decision states the following: " … 1. The relief sought is the review 
and setting aside of the refusal of Outsurance to update and erase policyholder 
information stored in the insurer's internal administration system, which has now led 
to the cancellation of an existing policy by Hollard. 2. This Office does not have the 
mandate to order an insurer to effect such an update or to change their internal 
administration system. … Take further notice that a person aggrieved by this 
decision, has the right to apply for the reconsideration of the decision by the Financial 
Services Tribunal as contemplated in section 230 of the Financial Sector Regulation 
Act". Kloppers 2007 Obiter 138; Godwin and Schmulow 2015 SALJ 762. The 
interplay between different regulators is referred to as soft law.  
10  Pečarič 2016 SAPL 93. The author explains the inability to define administrative law; 
Kohn 2013 SAPL 22-93. This s 230 is relevant to the statutory ombud and/or Ombud 
Council. The statutory ombud is the FAIS Ombud and the OSTI forms part of the 
Ombud Council. See the discussion on the Ombud Council by the Department of 
National Treasury (National Treasury 2017 http://www.treasury.gov.za/ 
twinpeaks/Final%20Twin%20Peaks%20Policy%20Doc_A%20known%20and%20tr
usted%20ombuds%20system%20for%20all_September2017.pdf 19). For example, 
a proposed JSE ombud could form part of the Ombud Council.  
11  I.e., the FAIS Act is a financial sector law and in s 1 of the Act it defines a complaint. 
N KILIAN  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  5 
2 A recent practical example of sections 230(1)(a) and 
218(d) 
2.1  Swanepoel v Outsurance 
In 2009 Mr Swanepoel submitted a vehicle write-off claim to Outsurance 
Insurance Company.12 Mr Swanepoel was the client of the insured vehicle 
at that time and he made the vehicle available to a friend who had vehicle 
problems.13 Subsequently, his friend was involved in an accident and the 
vehicle was a write-off. In 2009 Outsurance argued that the claim submitted 
was based on fraud or had a fraudulent motive. Accordingly, Outsurance 
held that Mr Swanepoel's friend, the driver of the vehicle at the time of the 
accident, had the intention of writing off the vehicle based on an instruction 
from Mr Swanepoel. In 2011 a criminal matter was opened against Mr 
Swanepoel and eventually the matter was declared nolle prosequi 
(termination of legal proceedings by the prosecutor) at the end of 2012. 
What is unclear in S v Swanepoel was the fact that the driver of the vehicle, 
who it was alleged had been instructed by Swanepoel to deliberately write 
off the vehicle, was offered money by a company representing the insurer 
to give such false evidence.14 At the beginning of 2018 Mr Swanepoel was 
involved in an accident and the motor vehicle was also consequently a write-
off. However, the company with which the vehicle was insured refused to 
pay the claim on the basis of the non-disclosure of fraud of the 2009 incident 
on the insurance application form.15 On this basis Mr Swanepoel 
approached the FAIS Ombud.16 The complaint was formulated to request 
the Ombud to compel Outsurance to update Mr Swanepoel's records, that 
                                            
12  Swanepoel v Outsurance Insurance Company FAB 71/2018 unreported 
reconsideration of a decision by the Financial ServicesTribunal.  
13  Swanepoel v Outsurance FSOS 02742-18/19-GP 3 unreported determination. The 
FAIS Ombud did not make a determination on the correctness of the factual 
circumstances explained by the applicant. This matter is not available on the internet 
but the office of the Ombud can be contacted for research purposes. The author of 
this article assisted the complainant to present his or her complaint to the offices of 
the FAIS Ombud and Financial Services Tribunal.  
14  Swanepoel v Outsurance FSOS 02742-18/19-GP 3 unreported determination. The 
FAIS Ombud was requested to investigate the complaint where the applicant 
(Swanepoel) gave a background description of the factual circumstances in 2009, 
i.e. a company representing Outsurance had offered witnesses R38 000 each to 
show that Swanepoel had orchestrated his own loss. This statement was also 
investigated by the South African Police in Pretoria (South Africa) in the matter of S 
v Swanepoel (Gauteng Regional Court Division) (unreported) case number 
44/07/2011 and in this case the end result of the investigation of fraud committed by 
the client was declared nolle prosequi by the court on 28 December 2012. For 
practical reasons, the offering of money and/or fraud committed by the client is 
irrelevant to this article.  
15  Van Niekerk 2005 SA Merc LJ (Part 1) 150-169; Van Niekerk 2005 SA Merc LJ (Part 
2) 323-339; Donnelly 2018 SALJ 593-612.  
16  Millard and Kuschke 2014 PELJ 2411-2450.  
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is, to take note of the unsuccessful criminal prosecution for fraud in 2012, 
when sharing Mr Swanepoel's 2009 accident with other insurers, or to delete 
fraud as a consequence of nolle prosequi.17 The FAIS Ombud was not 
requested to investigate the correctness of the rejected claim by Outsurance 
or to set aside this claim but rather to consider whether it was appropriate 
for Outsurance to disclose fraud to other insurers as a result of nolle 
prosequi and therefore Outsurance should update Mr Swanepoel's 
records.18 In other words, the records should at least include the 
unsuccessful criminal prosecution of the rejected claim and not only the 
phrase "fraudulent claim".19 The Office of the FAIS Ombud stated the 
following: that it does not "have the mandate to order an insurer to effect 
such an update or to change their internal administration system" and as a 
result, the FAIS Ombud decided not to investigate the complaint.20  
3 The FAIS Act as a financial sector law  
To establish whether such a request to compel the insurer to update its 
records is relevant, the FAIS Ombud focussed on its statutory complaints 
                                            
17  Gert Goeiman v Rekathusa Funeral Parlour FSOS 00340/14-15/NW 2 para 6. In this 
matter the Funeral Parlour collected premiums from the insured but the insured had 
to prove the collection of the premiums. In terms of s 1 of the FAIS Act, a complaint 
is defined and has reference to financial services; financial services refers to 
intermediary services as defined in section 1, i.e. the collection of premiums. For all 
practical purposes, the internal administration system of the Funeral Parlour also 
contravened proper administration as an intermediary service, as required by s 1. 
However, the FAIS Ombud did not refer to this in the determination; also see David 
Jackson Mbetse v Pieter De Wet FSOS 00132/13-14/GP3 paras 3 and 9, where the 
insurer (Pieter De Wet) did not honour the payment of claims. Claims are also a 
component of intermediary services and therefore constitute part of the definition of 
a complaint in order to establish jurisdiction for the office of the Ombud. In addition, 
the respondent was unable to provide/prove policy documents had been sent to the 
applicant as part of administration or maintenance as an intermediary service. 
Although the Ombud referred to this, establishing jurisdiction for the FAIS Ombud 
also forms part of the definition of a complaint; Van der Merwe v Forum SA Trading 
FSOS 05474/14-15 para 8, the insurer failed to update its internal administration 
system to show that the insured had obtained a certificate for a tracking device. This 
is also an intermediary service, although the FAIS Ombud did not specifically refer 
to the administration and/or maintenance of the insurer's internal system. Because 
the insurer had never updated its system with any certificate, the insurer rejected the 
claim on the basis that there was no evidence of any tracking device having been 
fitted to the vehicle.  
18  Swanepoel v Outsurance FSOS 02742-18/19-GP 3 unreported determination. 
19  The client requested Outsurance to update its records, ie, nolle prosequi, when 
sharing client information with other insurers.  
20  See fn 9 above.  
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jurisdiction in section 1 of the above mentioned Act.21 In section 1 a 
complaint is defined as follows:22 
means, subject to section 26(1)(a)(iii), a specific complaint relating to a 
financial service rendered by a financial services provider or representative to 
the complainant on or after the date of commencement of this Act, and in 
which complaint it is alleged that the provider or representative: 
(a) has contravened or failed to comply with a provision of this Act and that 
as a result thereof the complainant has suffered or is likely to suffer 
financial prejudice or damage; 
(b) has willfully or negligently rendered a financial service to the 
complainant which has caused prejudice or damage to the complainant 
or which is likely to result in such prejudice or damage; or 
(c) has treated the complainant unfairly; 
It is therefore necessary to focus on the definition of financial services 
provider in section 1: 
means any person, other than a representative, who as a regular feature of 
the business of such a person: 
(a) Furnish advice; or 
(b) Furnish advice and renders an intermediary service; or 
(c) Renders an intermediary service. 
To understand what intermediary services are as quoted above, it is also 
important to make reference to intermediary services as defined in section 
1: 
means, subject to subsection (3)(6), any act other than the furnishing of 
advice, performed by a person for or on behalf of a client or product supplier- 
(b) with a view to: 
(i) buying, selling or otherwise dealing in (whether on a discretionary 
or non-discretionary basis), managing, administering, keeping in 
safe custody, maintaining or servicing a financial product 
purchased by a client from a product supplier or in which the 
client has invested; 
                                            
21  Millard and Kuschke 2014 PELJ 2414. The authors did not discuss the duties of the 
insurer after the point of sale.  
22  Kloppers 2007 Obiter 133-142; Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical 
Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 9. The 
Appeal Court referred to s 1 of the FAIS Act, more specifically, the definition of 
intermediary services.  
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(ii) collecting or accounting for premiums or other moneys payable 
by the client to a product supplier in respect of a financial product; 
or 
(iii) receiving, submitting or processing the claims of a client against 
a product supplier. 
To understand the definition of a client, section 1 defines a client as follows: 
means a specific person or group of persons, excluding the general public, 
who is or may become the subject to whom a financial service is rendered 
intentionally, or is the successor in title of such person or the beneficiary of 
such service. 
A financial services provider includes either a registered broker or insurer 
and a financial services provider always performs intermediary services, for 
example by selling insurance policies or dealing with claims received from 
a client.23 From the above definitions it is not clear when the relationship 
with a client (i.e. a policyholder) ends, such as in relation to keeping in safe 
custody or administering client records and the like. Section 1 defines a 
client without making reference to a valid insurance agreement between the 
insurer (the financial services provider) and the client. If the policy contract 
is cancelled due to a rejected claim, then for all practical purposes the 
person is no longer a policyholder but can nevertheless be a client due to 
the "rendered" financial services, as defined above, relevant to the safe-
keeping of client records and suchlike.24 In the above, intermediary services 
as defined in section 1(b)(i) makes reference to "maintenance", 
"administration" and "safe keeping", and all are explicit examples and, thus, 
are also relevant components of the definition of a complaint to establish 
the jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud. In addition, Mr Swanepoel was unaware 
of the fact that Outsurance as a financial services provider had never 
updated its internal administrative records to reflect nolle prosequi for fraud 
in 2012.25 Mr Swanepoel realised this fact only in 2018, when he submitted 
                                            
23  Kloppers 2007 Obiter 133-142. Broker, insurer and policyholder are not defined by 
the FAIS Act. S 7(1) requires a licence to operate as either a broker or insurer as a 
financial services provider.  
24  See fn 3 above, the definition of a policy which includes a policyholder. The FAIS 
Act, s 16 (2)(b), simply requires adequate and appropriate record-keeping. To 
update the internal system with information relevant to a rejected claim is probably 
appropriate, keeping in mind that client information is public information i.e. to be 
shared with other insurers, and/or records of monthly payments of premiums are to 
be shared with relevant credit bureaux and other insurers. See in general Cape 
Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 1013 
(SCA) that breach of contract is not subject to administrative law.  
25  Van der Merwe v Forum SA Trading FSOS 05474/14-15. The insurer failed to 
disclose the necessary requirements for a tracking device and failed to take note of 
a device fitted by the client, yet the latter action was never updated on the internal 
administration system of the insurer; Church 2013 De Jure 859-868.  
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a claim to a different insurer.26 In this matter the FAIS Ombud simply argued 
that their offices did not have jurisdiction to consider it as being a complaint 
and that prescription was also relevant in this regard.27 Consequently, the 
FAIS Ombud suggested that the complainant must refer the matter to the 
Financial Services Tribunal to reconsider the decision of the Ombud.28 The 
decision not to investigate the complaint thus became an administrative 
decision in terms of section 230 of the FSRA, and the consequences of such 
a decision are regulated by the PAJA in section 8.29 Section 8 will be 
discussed later in this article. In addition, it is possible to criticise the referral 
of the matter to the Financial Services Tribunal because the FAIS Ombud 
failed to focus on the simple definition of a client, or to explain the 
relationship between a client and a financial services provider/insurer in 
regard to administering records, as was discussed in section 1, above to 
establish jurisdiction (or a mandate to investigate the complaint) for the FAIS 
Ombud.30  
4 Intermediary services 
In the FAIS Act, it is simply stated that a financial services provider/insurer 
must "safe keep" the records of clients for a minimum period of five years.31 
                                            
26  Diandra Laura Adams v Horn Carstens FSOS 00086/16-17/WC 3 paras 8, 11, 3, 19. 
The client only noticed incorrect details of a motor vehicle captured on the internal 
administration system of the insurer. The insurer had the vehicle as a 2003 model 
instead of a 2013 model. The action of updating records also falls under intermediary 
services although the FAIS Ombud did not specifically refer to such services as 
administration and maintenance. Only the submitted claim was the focus of 
discussion of the relevant intermediary service. The internal administration system 
was also unable to provide evidence that the applicant had insured her vehicle 
incorrectly in terms of the year model. The insurer never updated its internal 
administration system; Michelle Collard v Henry Grundling Makelaars CC FSOS 
00750/11-12/GP3 para 23. The requirement to update/maintain/administer the 
internal administration system of the insurer with new details of the client's risk was 
established, as in Quintainie CC v Sencla Financial Services FOC 2460/07-08/GP3 
para 8. It is normal business practice to update client records, for example to add 
additional risk. At para 34 the client must give appropriate information to an insurer 
to insure a risk properly in term of s 8(1) of the GCCFSP, which is contained in the 
FAIS Act. On the other hand, it is not quite clear when the sharing of client 
information with other insurers is reliable. In this regard, s 8(1) could offer an 
explanation as to the meaning of reliable information, such as an unsuccessful 
criminal prosecution, to avoid the possibility of another insurer rejecting a future 
claim. In this regard, full disclosure of the risk of accepting a client will be made to 
another insurer. 
27  See fn 9 above.  
28  Swanepoel v Outsurance FSOS 02742-18/19-GP 3 unreported determination. In s 
27(5)(a) of the FAIS Act, the FAIS Ombud may apply any procedure to investigate a 
complaint, i.e. with legal representation and/or by mediation only.  
29  Pečarič 2016 SAPL 96. Legislation cannot properly explain how to strike a balance 
between public administrative regulations and individual rights. 
30  Kloppers 2007 Obiter 138. Examples are discussed to establish jurisdiction.  
31  FAIS Act, s 18. 
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It is also stated in section 11 of the General Code of Conduct for Financial 
Services Providers and their Representatives (hereafter GCCFSP), which 
is required in terms of section 15 of the FAIS Act, that a financial services 
provider (i.e., an insurer) must not participate in the poor administration of 
client records or be liable for an omission, that is, a reluctance to update 
records.32 What is of interest is the fact that section 11 has no time period 
assigned to this section, and one may therefore assume that the good 
administration of records is required indefinitely; keeping the above 
definition of a client in mind.33 It can, prima facie, be argued that the 
consequences of intermediary services as explained in section 1 of the FAIS 
Act (such as maintaining and managing records) should at least have 
included Mr Swanepoel's unsuccessful criminal prosecution in 2012, to 
allow other insurers to take note of it. On the other hand, section 12(a-c) of 
the GCCFSP also states that the sharing of client information between 
insurers should always be reliable. There is also no time period assigned to 
this section for when this duty of sharing reliable information should expire.34 
It is, prima facie, arguable that reliable information or records should have 
included the unsuccessful prosecution of the client for fraud at the end of 
2012 and should have been updated indefinitely because section 12(c) 
requires a financial services provider/insurer to comply with all applicable 
laws.35 In focussing on these two sections (sections 11 and 12) of the 
GCCFSP, it seems that the FAIS Ombud did have the jurisdiction to 
consider the dispute as a complaint and it is also clear (as indicated above) 
that intermediary services are not limited to a specific time period, as 
administration or maintenance is further regulated in sections 11 and 12 of 
the GCCFSP.36 It is also therefore possible to argue that prescription could 
                                            
32  Chapter 4 of the FAIS Act requires a code of conduct for financial services providers. 
33  Emile de Beer v SAPCOR Broking Services FSOS 04761/11-12/FS3 paras 7, 25, 
26, 34. The insurer failed to update or properly maintain the records of the client due 
to negligence on the part of the broker. The latter failed to inform the insurer that it 
should update an endorsement. Here the FAIS Ombud refers specifically to s 11 of 
the GCCFSP to prevent any omissions.  
34  “Reliable” may indicate a continuous duty, since the safekeeping of records is 
relevant to the client of the insurer. S 12(a)-(c) states the following: "A provider … 
must without limiting the generality of section 11, structure the internal control 
procedures concerned so as to provide reasonable assurance that: (a) The relevant 
business can be carried on in an orderly and efficient manner; (b) Financial and other 
information used or provided by the provider will be reliable; and (c) All applicable 
laws are complied with." 
35  See fn 34. Construction Men at Work CC v KRDS Insurance Brokers FSOS 00458-
12/13/KZN 3 paras 20, 21. A financial services provider, i.e. a broker or insurer, must 
be able to prove compliance with relevant sections of the FAIS Act.  
36  Section 11 of the GCCFSP states: "A provider must at all times have effectively 
employed the resources, procedures and appropriate technological systems that can 
reasonably be expected to eliminate as far as reasonably possible, the risk that 
clients … will suffer financial loss through … poor administration, negligence … or 
culpable omissions"; Godwin and Schmulow 2015 SALJ 764. Different regulators 
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not be relevant, since Mr Swanepoel knew of this omission to update his 
records only when he submitted a claim in 2018.37 Accordingly, the FAIS 
Ombud advised the complainant to refer the matter to the Financial Services 
Tribunal for the reconsideration of their decision not to investigate the 
complaint (i.e. the updating of records). Before we focus on section 8 of the 
the PAJA, the following Appeal Court case in South Africa, which explains 
intermediary services in greater detail, is relevant to our discussion. This 
case is relevant to arguing why the FAIS Ombud probably acted correctly 
by referring the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication.38  
5 Tristar Investments Pty (Ltd) v The Chemical Industries 
National Provident Fund 
In this case, Tristar signed an agreement with the Chemical Industries Fund 
to provide certain services on behalf of the fund or to act in the best interest 
of the fund.39 Tristar had a financial services licence to provide advice only, 
but not to provide any intermediary services to any other person or the 
fund.40 The fund argued that Tristar not only gave advice but also 
intermediary services relating to the advice; therefore the agreement 
between the fund and Tristar was void and unlawful.41 The Appeal Court in 
this case focussed on the definition of intermediary services and relied on 
the common law principle of agency: as a person or agent who acts as a 
go-between or who acts between other persons.42 The agreement signed 
between the parties made provision for monitoring the investment portfolio 
of the fund and for managing the fund. This included managing and/or 
administering services relevant to intermediary services as defined in 
section 1 of the FAIS Act, but did it also include monitor?43 The purpose of 
                                            
could sign a memorandum of understanding to establish when a specific regulator 
could decide on a matter and when to refer the matter to a different regulator.  
37  Construction Men at Work CC v KRDS Insurance Brokers FSOS 00458-12/13/KZN 
3 para 20. The FAIS Ombud states that one must compare the conduct of a financial 
services provider with the sections in the GCCFSP or FAIS Act. Sometimes the FAIS 
Ombud uses rationality to determine the main focus area of a complaint – for 
instance, that a product was sold in violation of the GCCFSP or an administration 
system was not updated in violation of the GCCFSP.  
38  Swanepoel v Outsurance Insurance Company FAB 71/2018 unreported 
reconsideration of decision. 
39  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013). 
40  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 4.  
41  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 5. 
42  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 7. 
43  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) paras 10-12. 
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carrying out those administration services was simply to determine whether 
the fund was performing according to its asset managers' mandate. Tristar 
did not manage the financial product or the fund. It merely monitored the 
functions of the asset managers. The Appeal Court stated 
uncompromisingly that the reason why the legislator had to legislate 
managing, maintaining and or administering into legislation as intermediary 
services was unclear, since these are not per se always relevant to 
intermediary services. For example, to monitor the services of another 
person is neither to administer nor to manage.44 However, the Appeal Court 
held that the contract between the fund and Tristar was not only lawful but 
also valid, because the monitoring in this regard was not part of the definition 
of intermediary services such as managing and administering.45 Besides the 
latter Appeal Court case, the FAIS Ombud in the Swanepoel case could 
also have indicated that "monitoring" future events relevant to a client is not 
a realistic duty,46 or the FAIS Ombud could have explained what amounts 
to unreliable information, for example the sharing of information pertaining 
to fraud without reference to nolle prosequi. Needless to say, this is only a 
comment since the Ombud never expressed any opinion on the 
requirement(s) to update Mr Swanepoel's records or whether those records 
should be monitored in future as part of administration.47 In the following 
paragraph the Tribunal's reasoning is discussed. 
6 Financial Services Tribunal  
Mr Swanepoel subsequently submitted an application to reconsider the 
decision of the FAIS Ombud to the Financial Services Tribunal in terms of 
section 230 of the FSRA. As stated previously, it does have jurisdiction to 
reconsider the FAIS Ombud's failure to make a decision.48 In this regard it 
is also possible for a South African court to reconsider a decision of 
Outsurance not to update their client's records as part of a public function 
as regulated by the PAJA.49 This falls outside the scope of this article but 
                                            
44  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 15. 
45  Tristar Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 
2013 ZASCA 59 (16 May 2013) para 15. 
46  For example, to keep records for a minimum period of five years and or to share 
reliable information with other insurers.  
47  In the determinations cited in the above footnotes, the FAIS Ombud seldom refers 
to intermediary services which form the basis of a complaint to give jurisdiction to 
the FAIS Ombud.  
48  See para 7 below, i.e. the decision-maker (the FAIS Ombud) refuses to make a 
decision or takes too long to make an appropriate decision relevant to a client's 
complaint. 
49  Section 1 of the PAJA defines an administrative action as follows: "Administrative 
Action means any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by: (a) an organ 
of State, or (i) exercising their power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 
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the latter will be briefly referred to in paragraph eight of the article with 
reference to the National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril 
Naidoo, where the High Court considered the question "what entails a public 
function".50 Before we consider this question it is important to consider the 
following. One of the grounds submitted by Swanepoel as to why the 
Financial Services Tribunal must reconsider the decision was the principle 
of equity between the insurer and the client. The latter statement is 
supported by section 7(1)(c) of the FSRA, which requires fair treatment of 
clients. Mr Swanepoel requested the Financial Services Tribunal to apply 
section 7(1)(c), since it is equitable to update clients' records, and in addition 
a decision to update records falls within the jurisdiction of the FAIS 
Ombud.51 The Financial Services Tribunal did not give an express analysis 
of intermediary services, nor the relevance of prescription, nor the relevance 
of updating records with new information, nor the relevance of directing the 
matter back to the FAIS Ombud with instructions on how to investigate the 
complaint, nor to replace the decision of the Ombud with that of the 
Tribunal's decision.52 The Financial Services Tribunal simply confirmed that 
the complaint fell outside the authority or jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud and 
held that the grounds (discussed above) for why the Tribunal should 
investigate the matter were frivolous and vexatious. It was a simple 
                                            
of any legislation; or (b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of State, 
when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which 
has a direct, external legal effect … ". This will be extremely difficult. See in general 
Burns Administrative Law 149 fn 11. Also see in general Malherbe 2001 TSAR 1. 
50  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) para 17. The definition of an administrative action includes the power to exercise 
a public function.  
51  Kohn 2013 SAPL 25-26.  
52  PAJA in s 8. S 8 states the following: "(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for 
judicial review in terms of section 6(1), may grant any order that is just and equitable, 
including orders: (a) directing the administrator— (i) to give reasons; or (ii) to act in 
the manner the court or tribunal requires; (b) prohibiting the administrator from acting 
in a particular manner; (c) setting aside the administrative action and— (i) remitting 
the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without directions; or (ii) 
in exceptional cases— (aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or 
correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action; or (bb) directing the 
administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation; (d) 
declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which the 55 
administrative action relates; (e) granting a temporary interdictor other temporary 
relief or as to costs. (2) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in 
terms of section 6(3), may grant any order that is just and equitable, including 
orders— (a) directing the taking of the decision; (b) declaring the rights of the parties 
in relation to the taking of the decision; (c) directing any of the parties to do, or to 
refrain from doing, any actor thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which 
the court or tribunal considers necessary to do justice between the parties; or (d) as 
to costs." Burns Administrative Law 138-140. For a general interpretation of the 
administrative law relationship of inequality; the application of s 7(1)(c) points to the 
complex interplay with administrative decisions. In this regard see Kohn 2013 SAPL 
22-93; Henrico 2018 TSAR 288-307. 
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reconsideration of the decision without any reasoning or reasons being 
provided except for the fact that the complainant was vexatious in his 
approach.53 It is difficult to understand why Mr Swanepoel's complaint would 
be described as frivolous and/or vexatious. Generally, an abuse of court 
processes is prima facie evidence of vexatious behaviour. The Vexatious 
Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 in section 2(a) states the following, as an 
example:54  
If, on an application made by the State Attorney or any person acting under 
his written authority, the court is satisfied that any person has persistently and 
without any reasonable ground instituted legal proceedings in any court or in 
any inferior court, whether against the same person or against different 
persons, the court may, after hearing the person or giving him an opportunity 
of being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by him 
against any person in any court or any inferior court without the leave of that 
court, or any judge thereof, or that inferior court, as the case may be, and such 
leave shall not be granted unless the court or judge or the inferior court, as 
the case may be, is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the 
process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings. 
However, in the Swanepoel matter the word "fraud" is used on the 
Outsurance internal administration system. It is a serious matter to label a 
client as a fraudster based on the subjective investigation of the insurer and 
to ignore the unsuccessful criminal prosecution of the client in 2012.55 The 
consequences of fraud are extreme in the commercial world. For example, 
the rejection of a claim based on fraud would prevent the obtaining of future 
insurance. For this reason, it is unclear how the Financial Services Tribunal 
simply decided that the complainant was vexatious without any reasoning 
provided in its reconsideration of the FAIS Ombud's decision. Another 
reason could be the fact that it is difficult to apply the GCCFSP in practice, 
namely sections 11 and 12, as was discussed earlier pertaining to a time 
period.56  
7 PAJA 
Section 230 of the FSRA refers to the PAJA. Before commencing with the 
discussion in this section, it is important to consider who could be a decision 
                                            
53  Researchers may contact the office of the Financial Services Tribunal to request the 
reconsideration of the decision. An email can be sent to 
leg.appealboard@fsca.co.za.  
54  Emphasis added. Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary defines "vexatious" 
as "denoting to irritate" and "frivolous" as "meaningless"; Saunders 2006 Acta 
Juridica 426. The development of administrative law by legislation is discussed by 
the author; Henrico 2018 TSAR 293. The application of administrative law or the 
PAJA should lead to certainty in the law.  
55  See 2.1 fn. 14.  
56  Henrico 2018 TSAR 294. To establish certainty in the law, it is important to take note 
of how administrative law is pleaded before a court. This may be arbiter since the 
Tribunal did not consider the applicant's pleadings.  
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maker in terms of section 218 of the FSRA.57 The reason why these 
decisions are specifically identified as administrative decisions stems from 
the complexities of the South African common law regarding how to identify 
the failure to take a decision as part of administrative law. To some extent 
the PAJA defines an administrative decision, but it is very difficult to 
understand a public function in practice.58 The PAJA does not give suitable 
examples of different administrative decisions, as will be seen in paragraph 
eight below in the National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril 
Naidoo.59 Examples of statutorily defined administrative decisions are 
explained in the FSRA as follows: 
a) a decision by an Ombud;60 
b) a decision by an insurance company relevant to employee 
debarment;61 
c) a decision by a person in terms of the Financial Markets Act;62 
d) an omission to take a decision within a period relevant to a decision 
maker;63 
e) an omission to take a decision within a reasonable period when a 
financial sector law requires such a decision;64 and 
f) action taken as a result of such a decision amongst others.65 
Examples (b)-(d) fall outside the scope of this article. Action to be taken 
(example (f) above) as a result of such a decision is discussed in paragraph 
eight below with reference to section 8 of the FSRA.66 Example (e) above 
is part of section 26(1)(a)(viii) of the FAIS Act and it relates to a time limit 
within which a FAIS Ombud must deliver a determination. Should the time 
                                            
57  Burns Administrative Law 148-149. The annual general meeting of medical scheme 
members does not constitute an administrative decision and is not subject to review. 
An administrative decision or action is not defined by the Constitution of South Africa. 
58  Pennington v Friedgood 2002 3 BCLR 298 (C). What constitutes a public function or 
power is important for one to be able to identify possible administrative decisions in 
terms of s 1 of the PAJA. 
59  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N). 
60  FSRA in s 218(a). 
61  FSRA in s 218(b). 
62  FSRA in s 218(c). 
63  FSRA in s 218(f). 
64  FSRA in s 218(g) and (i). 
65  FSRA in s 218(h).  
66  In s 8, the PAJA furnishes the remedies applicable for instance to the failure by the 
FAIS Ombud to make an administrative decision; Grote 2004 SAPL 513-514.  
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limit be exceeded without receiving a determination, this constitutes a 
decision in terms of the FSRA. With respect to the above decisions, a 
decision-maker includes the following persons/organisations: 
a) A financial sector regulator such as the Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority.67 
b) An ombud Council such as OSTI in future.68 
c) A statutory ombud such as the FAIS Ombud.69 
In the above, (a) and (b) fall outside the scope of this article. From the above 
it is clear that an insurer (such as Outsurance) is not a "decision-maker" in 
terms of section 218 of the FSRA. In this regard, in order to argue that 
Outsurance is also a decision-maker the relevance of a public function is 
important. In this regard, decisions or decision-makers of the FSRA are 
irrelevant. In other words, an Outsurance decision not to update client 
records cannot be reconsidered by section 230 of the FSRA. In this regard 
a court can review the decision as part of a public function of the PAJA.70  
8 PAJA pertaining to a public function of the insurer 
without the application of FSRA 
In the National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo, 
Naidoo was banned by a decision of the National Horse Racing Authority of 
Southern Africa from participating in the training of horses for races since 
he had used drugs to gain an unfair advantage as a horse trainer.71 The 
High Court had to decide whether this decision fell under the PAJA.72 In its 
decision the court focussed on the definition of an administrative action in 
section 1, which includes a decision of a natural or juristic person in terms 
of an empowering provision which adversely affects the rights of any person 
when exercising a public power or function.73 In this regard the court 
                                            
67  FSRA in s 218(a) decision maker. 
68  FSRA in s 218(b) decision maker. 
69  FSRA in s 218(e) of decision maker. 
70  See in general Grote 2004 SAPL 513, 530; Swanepoel v Outsurance Insurance 
Company FAB 71/2018 unreported reconsideration of decision. 
71  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) paras 17-24. 
72  Burns Administrative Law 148-149. See Johannesburg Stock Exchange v 
Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 3 SA 132 (A) where the court had to decide whether 
the decisions of the JSE are in fact a public function, and confirmed that they were. 
Also see Herbert Porter & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1974 4 SA 781 
(W) 791, that a circular sent to shareholders is not subject to administrative review; 
Saunders 2006 Acta Juridica 423-449. 
73  Section 1 of the PAJA defines an administrative action as follows: "Administrative 
Action means any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by: (a) an organ 
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focussed on the constitution of the given National Horse Racing Authority 
of Southern Africa as an empowering provision.74 In terms of whether such 
a decision (the banning of Naidoo) is a public function, the court simply held 
that horse racing is regulated by the government,75 and therefore ticket 
sales and/or inviting the public to races and/or debarring persons from 
participating in races are indeed public functions.76 For this reason, the court 
stated that such a decision between private individuals should be subjected 
to the provisions of the PAJA.77 Wallis J held the following view:78 
I can find nothing in the general language of the definition of administrative 
action in PAJA that demonstrates a clear intention to exclude sporting bodies 
that regulate their sport in terms of a constitution and rules. No such exclusion 
appears from the language itself which propounds a different test of exercising 
a public power or performing a public function. Sport has a substantial 
influence in our society and can involve substantial sums of money as well as 
exercising control over who may earn their living from involvement in sporting 
activities. Sport raises important public issues as is apparent from the fact that 
the President has seen fit to appoint commissions of enquiry into both rugby 
and cricket. Government has a substantial interest in sport as evidenced by 
the existence of the department of Sport and Recreation and the creation of 
the Sports Commission. 
The Government also regulates financial services by legislation and the 
legislation regulates the relationship between the FAIS Ombud, the client 
and the insurer on the one hand and on the other hand the FAIS Ombud 
and the Financial Services Tribunal.79 However, irrespective whether or not 
it is a decision-maker in terms of the FSRA (for example the FAIS Ombud) 
or a decision maker in terms of a public function of the PAJA (for example 
Outsurance), in both cases section 8 of the PAJA is relevant and applicable. 
Therefore, in our view it is possible for the Financial Services Tribunal to 
                                            
of State, or (i) exercising their power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 
of any legislation; or (b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of State, 
when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which 
has a direct, external legal effect … ." 
74  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) para 20. 
75  See in general the meaning of public power in Van Zyl v New National Party 2003 
10 BCLR 1167 (C) para 75.  
76  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) paras 13, 29. S 8 of the PAJA allows for natural justice between the parties. See 
also in general the relationship between contractual rights and administrative law in 
Basson t/a Repcomm Community Repeater Services v Post-Master General 1994 3 
SA 224 (SE).  
77  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) para 16. 
78  National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Cyril Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 
(N) para 22.  
79  FAIS Act and FSRA as examples. 
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deliver either one of the following two reconsiderations relevant to the FAIS 
Ombud's decision not to investigate the matter:80 
a) In terms of a failure to take a decision on the part of the FAIS Ombud,81 
the Ombud could be directed by the Financial Services Tribunal to take 
a decision to transfer the term "fraud" to that part of the internal 
administration system which will not be shared with other insurance 
companies.82 
b) It could set aside the failure of the FAIS Ombud to take a decision and 
replace the decision with that of the Financial Services Tribunal; that 
is, the Tribunal makes a decision regarding the way Outsurance must 
update its internal administration system, for example by deleting the 
term "fraud" as a result of the unsuccessful criminal prosecution.83 
c) Scenario - (a) and (b) above – could apply equally to Outsurance as a 
"decision-maker", and a court could either direct (a) or (b) above to 
Outsurance if a public function is established by a court in terms of the 
PAJA. In this regard FSRA is not relevant because Outsurance is not 
a decision-maker.84 
Mr Swanepoel realised only in 2018 that the records had never been 
updated, therefore the FAIS Ombud's argument that prescription could exist 
should have been irrelevant when one considers section 5.85 Prescription 
should be relevant only when the client is aware of the fact that the records 
have never been updated by the insurer.86  
9 Conclusion 
It remains unclear as to how the Tribunal could merely have held that Mr 
Swanepoel's complaint was vexatious. The Tribunal had a golden 
opportunity to explain intermediary services and/or to interpret the sharing 
of information as a public function or at least to have offered a just 
interpretation of the rights between the parties (Outsurance and Mr 
                                            
80  Van Heerden 2009 Journal of Public Administration 183-195.  
81  Section 6(2)g of the PAJA. 
82  Section 8(2)a-d of the PAJA. 
83  Section 8(1)(c)(ii) of the PAJA. 
84  See fn 71. 
85  Burns Administrative Law 57-60. S 195(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 requires that a public record should always be accurate in 
information. To be precise, prescription is not relevant unless s 5 of the PAJA is 
applicable.  
86  See prescription as regulated in s 27(2) of the FAIS Act.  
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Swanepoel).87 In terms of the Tribunal's decision, the applicant is labelled 
indefinitely as a fraudster on the Outsurance system.88 In addition, the 
Tribunal did not consider whether the future sharing of information 
pertaining to the fraud was the sharing of reliable or unreliable information.89 
It is evident that a reluctance to update internal administration systems or 
records with new and relevant information could indeed constitute grounds 
for a complaint in terms of section 1 of the FAIS Act.90 However, this Act is 
not clear as to when intermediary services should be terminated between 
an insurer and its clients, since the FAIS Act does not define a client clearly. 
This is a tacit indication that intermediary services could continue 
indefinitely.91 Furthermore, the FAIS Act contains no specific time period 
after which all client records or information should be destroyed.92 In 
addition, in regard to the failure of the FAIS Ombud to take a decision, the 
Tribunal could have made a decision by either referring the complaint back 
to the FAIS Ombud with further instructions on how to make a decision or 
by replacing the failure to make a decision with a Tribunal decision.93 The 
Tribunal did not analyse the legal arguments presented above, and it 
remains a mystery as to why the complainant was vexatious.94 Maybe the 
time is ripe for South Africa to rewrite the FAIS Act to render it clearer and 
more coherent.95 
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